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I. Introduction
On 1 April 2007 Korea and the United States fi nally completed their year-long 
negotiations to conclude the Korea- U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), 
which was then signed by the representatives of the two states on 30 June 2007 
in Washington, D.C. (MOFAT 2007a; 2007b). The agreement is currently waiting 
for ratifi cation by the legislative bodies of the two countries. The ratifi cation 
process has been delayed for more than a year, and in the middle of the U.S. 
election year the general perception seems to be that the ratifi cation probably 
will not happen in the immediate future. Nonetheless, the two governments 
have repeatedly expressed positive views on the prospect of ratifi cation within 
2008 or early 2009 and confi rmed that they would continue to exert best efforts 
to get it done as soon as possible. Once ratifi ed, the agreement then goes into 
effect 60 days after the exchange of instruments notifying the other side of the 
completion of the domestic procedure (USTR 2007, art. 24.5).
Korea has concluded approximately 2,500 treaties since its inception in 1948, 
but probably none of them has caused such heated controversy and debate as 
we are observing with respect to this particular agreement. Opponents of the 
KORUS FTA in Korea have been strongly criticizing this agreement, stating it 
will lead to eventual eschewal of Korean sovereignty in various vital national 
policy areas by integrating the economic system of Korea into that of the United 
States. Proponents of the agreement, in contrast, argue that the KORUS FTA will 
offer a crucial stepping-stone to revitalizing the Korean economy by increasing 
the trade volume with the United States and upgrading the regulatory system and 
market structure in Korea. Korea has been sharply divided over this agreement. 
The situation in the United States does not seem to be that much different, 
although the national division may not be as acute as in Korea.
In this process, the prospective benefi ts and side-effects of the KORUS FTA 
have been relatively well studied and documented (McDaniel and Fox 2001, 
5–9, 5–22). These studies collectively seem to indicate that both countries will 
enjoy economic benefi ts in the long run, although there may be some political 
repercussions and economic readjustments in the immediate aftermath of the 
FTA.
Setting that issue aside for now, this paper aims to discuss briefl y what the 
bilateral economic relationship would be like without the KORUS FTA: Would 
the absence of the FTA better serve the bilateral economic relationship? Would 
the two countries be able to manage the bilateral economic relationship more 
effi ciently but for the FTA? Would the FTA indeed make the Korean government 
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vulnerable to unnecessary disputes at various levels that would never arise but 
for the FTA? This paper then concludes that most of the problems allegedly to 
be caused by the KORUS FTA will probably be there anyway, regardless of the 
FTA, and that, although not perfect, the FTA could provide a more workable 
framework in which to manage these problems.
This line of inquiry would be meaningful as the controversy over the KORUS 
FTA has been triggered (at least in Korea) mainly by the erroneous notion that 
the FTA is the source of all evils. If Korea and the United States are bound to 
face similar problems regardless of the FTA, such a proposition could hardly 
stand. A more proper question then should be whether the proposed FTA would 
provide a better alternative than the current regime or any other viable option 
for dealing with or solving these problems.
II. Bilateral Relationship without the FTA
Let us think about what the bilateral trade environment would be like without 
the proposed KORUS FTA. The point is, it is quite likely that the two countries 
will probably face the same problems and the same issues regardless. The 
specifi c settings and claims could be different from case to case, but the general 
contours of the disputes will probably be the same. For instance, the beef dispute 
would have presented itself anyway because both Korea and the United States 
are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures would have invited trade disputes anyway 
as long as Korea maintained its import restriction measure (USTR 2006). Korea 
would have lodged complaints against the United States regarding its so-called 
“zeroing” practice anyway at the WTO.1 Both disputes were key issues discussed 
in the context of the KORUS FTA (MOFAT 2006).
Thus, a strong argument can be made that to some extent the key issues being 
discussed in the context of the KORUS FTA have not been simply caused by 
the FTA or the outcome of the FTA; rather, they would have been raised in any 
event under the circumstances. To put it more bluntly, most of the issues 
1.  Many countries have lodged formal complaints with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against the 
United States for its zeroing practice. Korea has been participating in almost all zeroing-related disputes 
at the WTO as a third party to make an argument against the United States. These disputes (which 
can be accessed at the WTO Web site www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm) 
are United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (DS350), United 
States—Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador (DS335), United States—Measures Relating 
to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (DS322), and United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins (DS294).
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actually do not have much to do with the FTA at all, other than that they were 
sometimes the bargaining chips on the negotiating tables. Such being the case, 
it would not be reasonable to attribute major pending problems and upcoming 
disputes at the bilateral level simply to the negotiations and conclusion of the 
KORUS FTA. The situation is apparently more complex than that. As a practical 
matter, of course, it would be diffi cult to determine which issues are to be raised 
anyway and which not, but by taking this aspect of the matter into consideration 
one could have a more realistic sense of the impact of the KORUS FTA. Several 
factors—ROK-U.S. bilateral trade continuing, increasing, and being regulated; 
trade disputes continuing; FTAs with other countries continuing; political 
repercussions occurring—need to be considered.
Bilateral Trade Will Continue and Increase
In 2007, Korea was the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States, 
and the United States was the second-largest trading partner of Korea (MOFAT 
2008b). In fact, in terms of the global trade volume, the United States is the 
largest trading country and Korea is the twelfth-largest trading country in the 
world. There certainly will be fl uctuations in the volume of bilateral trade, but 
it is almost certain that the bilateral trade between Korea and the United States 
will continue to take up a signifi cant portion of the total trade volumes of the 
two countries (Census 2008, exhibit 14).2 So, even without the FTA, Korea-U.S. 
bilateral trade will remain at a signifi cant level, probably at least at the current level.
If that is the reality, then the burden and pressure fl owing from the reality will 
remain. For instance, continued negotiation, explanation, consultation, and 
confrontation between the two countries will be inevitable. With this level of 
trade volume, disputes of all sorts would be a monthly, not if daily, routine. It 
is recommended that any discussion should always start from the recognition 
of this reality.
Bilateral Trade Will Continue to be Regulated
In addition, the signifi cant volume of bilateral trade is not unregulated at this 
point. It is already extensively regulated by various norms of the WTO and other 
relevant international norms. Also, as is well known, the WTO has been 
2.  Although there are some fl uctuations, the bilateral ROK-U.S. trade volume in absolute numbers 
has been steadily increasing. Note that, although the bilateral trade volume in relative numbers seems 
to be decreasing somewhat recently, this is mainly because of the “Chinese diversion” effect, namely, 
that Korean products made in China and destined for the U.S. market are not accounted for in Korean 
statistics.
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extending its reach into various domestic sectors over during recent years to 
the extent where some members are seriously challenging its legitimacy (WTO 
2008a, paras. 7.120–7.129). Unless and until there is an amendment to the WTO 
agreements, the two countries are strictly subject to the WTO norms whether 
we like them or not (WTO 1994, art. 16.4).
So, basically what we have here, even in the absence of the FTA, is a “signifi cant” 
volume of trade subject to the “extensive” regulation of the WTO, which these 
days does not seem to enjoy as wide support from its constituents as it used 
to. The remaining question then becomes whether the two countries would be 
better off with a special regime that governs the signifi cant level of bilateral 
trade or whether they would fare better under the current multilateral regime 
of the WTO.
As indicated in the recent suspension of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
negotiations, it is not entirely clear whether the WTO would be able to establish 
a new framework that would somehow satisfy all the members (WTO-TNC 
2008). It is not entirely clear either whether the WTO would be able to provide 
a regime that could effectively manage the Korea-U.S. bilateral relationship in 
the years ahead. In fact, it is not clear at all whether the DDA will indeed come 
through in the near future.
Again, the two countries have a signifi cant volume of bilateral trade no matter 
what. The two countries will have to make a decision as to what they will do with 
that: Do they entirely rely upon the WTO, hoping that it recovers its dwindling 
support in some remarkable fashion? Or do they explore by themselves a 
mechanism that can manage this signifi cant bilateral trade? They could certainly 
go either way, but the better alternative seems to be the second path because 
the two countries would have more leeway in devising a trade regime that is 
specifi cally tailored to the needs of the two countries. Regulation of trade under 
that alternative then would be more predictable and manageable.
Trade Disputes Will Continue
More important, even if the KORUS FTA somehow falls through, this would not 
necessarily mean that the bilateral economic relationship is free of disputes or 
that there would be a fewer number of disputes in the future.3 The pending 
3.  A report by the Congressional Research Service (Manyin 2004, 9–17) states that the two countries 
were struggling with multiple trade frictions owing to the increased economic interaction when the 
idea of the FTA was being fl oated in mid-2004.
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disputes will remain pending: the automobile dispute will be there and the beef 
dispute will be there as well. The moment the KORUS FTA fails to be ratifi ed, 
Korea, following in the footsteps of the European Communities and Japan, may 
well bring legal action against the United States at the WTO for the U.S. zeroing 
practice (WTO 2006b; 2007);4 and the United States may well bring a legal 
action against Korea for Korea’s beef import restriction as it has done similarly 
vis-à-vis the European Communities in a related dispute (WTO 2006a).
During only on the 2007–08 period, there have been eight disputes at the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure that involve various legal frictions between the two 
countries, either as direct parties or as indirect parties.5 In the same time period, 
there have been fi ve separate investigations by the U.S. government into various 
government policies of Korea for various subsidy allegations. These bilateral 
disputes will continue to appear in various forums, forcing the two countries to 
face this reality.
The situation for disputes that are expected to present themselves for the fi rst 
time as a result of the KORUS FTA is not that much different. For instance, the 
investor-state dispute (ISD) settlement procedure adopted by the investment 
chapter of the KORUS FTA has caused signifi cant controversy in Korea (Chun 
2007).6 This is a unique dispute settlement mechanism exclusively applicable 
to bilateral investment disputes between an investor from one party and the 
government of the other party under the FTA framework (USTR 2007, arts. 11.16, 
11.17). This mechanism, however, is not actually new and has been consistently 
contained in other FTAs and bilateral investment treaties that Korea has 
concluded so far.7 So, even if that particular chapter had been removed from 
4. Korea actively participated in these proceedings as a third party against the United States.
5. These disputes are United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology 
(DS350), United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (DS353/DS317), 
Japan—Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea (DS336), United 
States—Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador (DS343), United States—Measures Relating 
to Shrimp from Thailand (DS335), United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews 
(DS322), European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (DS316/DS347), and United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating 
Dumping Margins (DS294). In these disputes, Korea and the United States have shown sharply divided 
opinions on key trade issues (WTO 2008b).
6. Also, on 6 April 2007, Dong-a Ilbo published an editorial, “Government Should Clear All 
Misconceptions and Puzzles Regarding FTA Negotiations,” http://english.donga.com/srv/service.
php3?biid=2007040607538.
7.  See, for example, Article 10.2 of the Korea-Chile FTA and Article 10.19 of the Korea-Singapore 
FTA.
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the KORUS FTA or if the KORUS FTA fell apart, this would not mean that the 
unexpected headache for the Korean government from this sort of new dispute 
would instantly disappear; it would be simply a matter of time for the Korean 
government to encounter ISD disputes in one way or another with respect to 
other trading partners, if not the United States.
At the same time, trade disputes will become more complex each year because 
the recent disputes do not simply remain in the trade area per se, but go beyond 
it. Recent bilateral trade issues now involve trade issues that touch upon other 
nontrade national sovereignty issues as well, as we have seen in the beef 
dispute and the ISD controversy. These nontrade areas include national security, 
environment, public health, economic stabilization policy, taxation, and the like.
Under these circumstances, it does not seem to be fair to describe, as some 
scholars argue in Korea, that the FTA will open the door to a situation in which 
the Korean government is forced to face endless legal actions by the U.S. 
government and businesses. The disputes have been steadily increasing over 
the years and will continue to do so in the future as long as the current level of 
trade volume and exchanges is maintained. At the same time, Korean investors 
in the United States will be able to resort to the provisions of this agreement 
when they receive discriminatory treatment in their business operations in the 
United States.8
The FTAs of and with Other Countries Will Continue
The world has been observing an explosion of FTAs. The pace will probably 
quicken in the days ahead, given the less-than-optimal development at the DDA. 
Other countries will probably continue to negotiate and conclude their respective 
FTAs with Korea. Korea is entering a fi nal stage of FTA negotiations with the 
European Union, another major trading partner. The United States signed an 
FTA with Australia in 2004, the United States has fi nished negotiations with 
Korea, and Australia is negotiating with Korea. So, it appears that Korea and 
the United States will also try to conclude FTAs with various trading partners 
down the road, regardless of the KORUS FTA and even if the KORUS FTA 
somehow does not come through.
8.  It is noteworthy that the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, a statute recently passed 
by the U.S. Congress, is phrased in a way that limits the fi nancial support under the statute to the 
U.S. automobile manufacturers, excluding Korean-invested automobile manufacturers in the United 
States.
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Thus, again, for the United States and Korea, the absence of the KORUS FTA 
does not necessarily mean that all the headaches are cured for good and problems 
solved instantly. The headaches and problems would simply sit there, though in 
a briefl y dormant phase, waiting for the next wave of FTAs with other trading 
partners to make them reappear on the stage. The two countries may be able to 
buy some time, but they will have to face the same or similar problems sooner 
or later.
This situation exists at the same time that these other competitors are getting 
benefi ts from their multiple, respective, overlapping FTAs among themselves, 
taking full advantage of the FTA exception clause under Article 24 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Article 5 of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, while Korea and the United States are completely bound by their 
“multilateral” obligation under the WTO with respect to their bilateral trade.
We have to ask again: What benefi t would be there for the two countries even if 
we eliminate the KORUS FTA factor? It seems to be the case that nonexistence 
of the KORUS FTA effectively translates into the following: The trade volume 
will continue to increase, the trade disputes will continue to increase, similar 
problems will continue to pose themselves in other negotiations, and other 
countries will enjoy full benefi t from their FTAs.
Political Repercussions in Case of Failure
If the proposed KORUS FTA fails to go into effect, the impact will not be simply 
confi ned to the obvious economic loss. Needless to say, political and diplomatic 
repercussions will certainly follow.9 This failure would signal that (1) the gaps 
and discrepancies between the two countries are so wide as to make them unable 
to conclude a free trade agreement when everybody else does, and (2) the two 
countries are sometimes unable to complete their domestic procedure at the last 
minute when it comes to critical trade agreements. Either could seriously damage 
the bargaining positions of the two countries in their future FTA negotiations 
with other countries. It is indeed doubtful whether the two countries are ready 
to accept these consequences.
9.  Joseph A. B. Winder (2007) of Winder International stated:
 A failure of the KORUS FTA negotiations would represent a serious setback to the overall  
 U.S. relationship. . . . If agreement cannot be reached in an area, which is so clearly win-  
 win for both sides, then how are the two countries to deal with the diffi cult political/   
 security issues where a mutually satisfactory resolution of many issues is less clear-cut?  
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III. KORUS FTA as a Framework for Managing the Bilateral  
Economic Relationship
Thus, trade friction between the two countries seems to be destined to rise, both 
in quantity and quality, given the volume of the bilateral trade and the changing 
nature of the disputes. This would basically mean that the two countries must 
encounter these multiple and complex disputes anyway, whether there is an FTA 
or not. As long as the two countries are engaged in trade between each other 
and as long as they remain major trading partners, trade disputes are simply 
inevitable. The question then is whether the KORUS FTA could provide a 
mechanism better than the one under the current regime in which to effectively 
manage these disputes so as to create a better environment for the maintenance 
of bilateral trade.
A fair argument can be made that, although not perfect, the current version 
of the KORUS FTA, if implemented in good faith and through reasonable 
implementation, stands ready to provide a framework for the two countries to deal 
with these issues.10 Two advantages can grow out of passage of the KORUS FTA.
Enhanced Understanding of the Other Side
The fundamental nature of the KORUS FTA basically forces the parties to look 
into, examine, and learn the domestic policies and regulations of the other side 
in a more in-depth manner. The agreement is designed in a way that requires 
each party to be more accurately apprised of the domestic systems and policies 
of the other party. The agreement certainly does not require policy coordination 
or cooperation, let alone integration, at the domestic levels, but it does require 
a better, fuller, and more accurate understanding of the other side in order for 
the agreement to be implemented as it has been designed.
By way of example, some of the issues posed in the KORUS FTA have led the 
Korean government and scholars to look into the U.S. domestic system more 
10. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens (2008) stated in a recent speech at AMCHAM Korea general 
membership meeting on 10 October 2008:
 And of course, the strategic importance of the FTA goes beyond that. This Korea-U.S.   
 Free Trade Agreement will establish a privileged economic partnership between our two  
 countries, and create a strong, binding reciprocal economic pillar for our bilateral relation-  
 ship, standing right alongside our security alliance.
See also Claude Barfi eld (2007):
 The bottom line is that the deep and comprehensive substance of the agreement will have a  
 great impact on future trade fl ows between the two nations and their major trading partners.
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carefully, at a level unprecedented in terms of both quantity and quality. It is 
indeed interesting to note how much study has taken place recently about the 
constitutional system, legal system, and political system of the United States as 
a result of the KORUS FTA negotiations. There have been 200 bilateral treaties 
concluded by Korea and the United States since 1948,11 and only the KORUS 
FTA has prompted all these inquiries into the U.S. system. The reason is obvious: 
to fully understand the impact of a particular provision and to get a general 
glimpse of the provision in actual application, such a study has turned out to be 
indispensable. Following are some of the interesting recent examples:
• There have been serious discussions on the holding and reasoning of 
major decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on “taking” of private property 
based on Article 5 of the U.S. Constitution. One of the key issues raised 
during the KORUS FTA was the so-called indirect expropriation, which is 
extensively based on the jurisprudence about the taking issue by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
• Serious studies and discussions have also taken place concerning the role 
of the U.S. Congress in the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements. 
One of the issues posed has been how much authority the U.S. Congress has 
when it comes to the negotiation and the ratifi cation of a trade agreement 
such as the KORUS FTA.
• The treaty-making process in the United States has also been extensively 
reviewed. The question was raised with respect to the legal validity of the 
documents negotiated and signed by the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) on the basis of its own authority and that do not go through the 
treaty-making process, or the executive agreement–making process for 
that matter, in the United States.
• Serious discussions have also been prompted by the KORUS FTA regarding 
the division of authority between the federal government in Washington, 
D.C., and the respective state governments. These discussions were 
triggered by the claim of the USTR that there are some issues that are not 
within the purview of the federal government under the U.S. Constitution, 
and Korea needed to confi rm what those issues were.
• Also examined in this context was the reason why the United States needs 
to adopt implementing legislation for the KORUS FTA. Having to adopt 
11. Currently 227 treaties are in force (MOFAT 2008a).
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 implementing legislation is unique in the Korean context because usually in 
Korea any agreement becomes a part of Korean domestic law the moment 
it is promulgated.
These are simply examples, and the list could go on and on. Again, this seems 
to be the fi rst time in the 60-year bilateral relationship that scrutiny at this level 
has been conducted into the key laws and regulations, governmental structure, 
and policy operating mechanisms of the United States. One could easily assume 
that similar scrutiny has also been conducted by the United States if it had not 
been done before.
All in all, for better or worse, this enhanced two-way understanding could 
probably reduce the total number of disputes by helping avoid unnecessary ones. 
The term “reduce” here basically means “reduce in relative terms.” As noted, the 
total number of disputes in absolute terms seems to be destined to rise, with or 
without the KORUS FTA, owing to the increase in trade volume, but the increase 
of the number of disputes in relative terms may slow down once the KORUS FTA 
produces its expected effect. This function of the KORUS FTA could be called 
a “dispute containment effect.” Rather than increased market penetration in the 
goods and services sectors, the benefi t of which can be immediately measured 
in a quantifi able yardstick, this dispute containment effect seems to be a more 
important, longer-term benefi t fl owing from the KORUS FTA when it comes 
to the bilateral economic relationship. It appears likely that this aspect has not 
been adequately taken into account.
Customized Dispute Avoidance and Settlement Procedure
After a dispute arises, the KORUS FTA seems to offer a more effective mechanism 
to deal with it than the WTO does. The KORUS FTA could facilitate resolution 
of a dispute by helping the parties focus on the core issues and by leading the 
parties to reach a mutually acceptable conclusion. There are multiple committees 
in various fi elds where pending issues can be raised and discussed in a prompt 
manner. Discussions in these committees could dispel misunderstanding and 
thus assist the two parties in reaching a quicker solution in various fi elds, as has 
been well illustrated by the effectiveness of the Quarterly Bilateral Trade Issue 
Review Meeting between the directors-general of the two governments during 
the past couple of years.12 In Korea, it is generally perceived that the quarterly 
12. This is a dialogue channel between the two governments in which a wide range of pending trade 
issues is discussed. The meeting was agreed upon in March 2001, and the fi rst meeting was held in 
June 2001 (MOFAT 2001). The most recent meeting was held on 28–29 October 2008 in Washington, 
D.C.
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meetings with the United States have been particularly productive and pivotal in 
addressing various pending issues, which may have paved the way for the FTA 
negotiations.13 The KORUS FTA could effectively offer an extended version 
of this kind of meeting. This could be called a “dispute management effect” of 
the KORUS FTA.
The FTA also contains a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism where a legal 
claim can be lodged by one party to the other party (USTR 2007, chap. 11). The 
two countries have already actively utilized the multilateral dispute settlement 
mechanism at the WTO (WTO 2008b), and the WTO regime is the only available 
dispute settlement avenue for the two countries at this time (USTR 2007, art. 23). 
Now the KORUS FTA is scheduled to introduce a dispute settlement mechanism 
that is applicable only to the two countries. This new mechanism does not exclude 
the multilateral track, so the two countries will have two routes to address the 
trade disputes as opposed to a single avenue as of today. Thus, the two countries 
will have an alternative dispute settlement mechanism for future disputes.
Generally speaking, this system under the FTA is more streamlined and subject 
to the parties’ control. The procedures under the FTA are designed to obtain a 
decision in a shorter time frame than its WTO counterpart, and the parties have 
more control over the reviewing panel. This is particularly meaningful as the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been criticized for the lengthy amount 
of time required for the procedure and the lack of standing panels to evaluate 
ever more complex trade disputes.14 These issues are indeed on the negotiating 
table for a possible amendment at the DDA negotiations (WTO 2008c).
More important, a more targeted selection of experts to deal with a dispute is 
possible during the FTA dispute settlement procedure. This would translate into 
the general proposition that the reviewing panel under the FTA has the ability 
to reach a decision that is more tailored to the specifi c nature of the bilateral dispute 
than a multilateral dispute settlement system offered by the WTO. Given the fact 
that the trade disputes between the two countries sometimes require 
13. The Korean government notes the usefulness and effectiveness of the meeting (MOFAT 2007c). 
Dong-a Ilbo on 22 March 2005 reported in “United States Sets Screen Quota as a Precondition for the 
KORUS FTA Negotiation [in Korean]” that the two governments also discussed various preconditions 
for the initiation of the KORUS FTA at these meetings.
14. Note that the KORUS FTA does not introduce a standing panel either, but the FTA will introduce a 
roster of experts from which panelists can be selected for a particular dispute (USTR 2007, art. 22.9). 
Although the WTO also has a roster of national experts, most of the time the panelists are not selected 
from the roster, so it is more diffi cult to predict the selection process and who will be selected for a 
particular dispute in the WTO setting.
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awareness of and insights into the overall bilateral relationship that may include 
nontrade consideration as well, this new mechanism may provide a useful setting in 
the particular context of the Korea-U.S. trade relationship. Again, the two countries 
still possess the option of going to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 
which may be preferred sometimes depending on the nature of the dispute.
So, all in all this would basically mean that bilateral trade disputes can be better 
managed under the FTA framework; unnecessary disputes can be avoided 
early on, and inevitable disputes can be more reasonably and quickly resolved. 
It is recommended that the discussion of FTA benefi ts not skip the dispute 
containment effect and the dispute management effect of the FTA.
A Caveat
Noted, also, that there are risk factors as well. As a framework, the KORUS 
FTA will also be a new challenge for the bilateral relationship. As much as 
the KORUS FTA stands ready to operate as a new paradigm for the bilateral 
economic relationship, wrong steps, intended or unintended, could also cause 
a far-reaching negative impact. Korea and the United States have been good 
economic partners for a long time. As with a human relationship, ratcheting up 
the state relationship would also require willingness to make a good-faith effort 
on a continuing basis to make the relationship work and to accept a short-term 
loss for a long-term gain. An attempt to create a closer partnership could ruin an 
existing partnership if two countries are not prepared to take on the challenges 
in a positive manner. 
Under the new paradigm, daunting tasks await the two countries: (1) they 
will face new issues that they have not dealt with before, (2) they will have to 
establish specifi c norms and guidelines in many sectors as they go along, (3) they 
will have to accommodate the increased presence and penetration of the goods 
and service providers from the other side despite sometimes fi erce domestic 
opposition, and (4) they will have to take various measures to implement the 
agreement domestically. A high expectation level may easily turn into a high 
disappointment level if the intended (or pronounced) result is not delivered in 
time. Such being the case, unless the two countries fully cooperate in good faith 
over the years, the agreement may turn out to be a source fomenting further 
mistrust and misperception. Unless managed well, the FTA could cause the 
bilateral relationship to deteriorate quickly.
The beef import restriction provides a good example. A seeming breakthrough 
for the bilateral economic relationship somehow turned into one of the most 
17149_159-176.indd   171 3/16/2009   4:15:04 PM
172 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
embarrassing incidents. This clearly evidences the importance of the leadership 
in the two countries when it comes to the KORUS FTA. The beef incident may 
be just the tip of the iceberg. Similar issues will come up over and over again 
in the FTA setting. In fact, the leadership factor will be all the more important 
after the KORUS FTA does go into effect and various provisions are put into 
operation. The ability, willingness, and determination of the two countries to 
develop the bilateral economic relationship under the new paradigm will then 
be truly tested.
IV. Conclusion: A Proper Approach for Evaluating the            
KORUS FTA
So far, it appears that the discussions about the KORUS FTA in the respective 
domestic interest groups have been mainly focused at a micro level: trying to 
fi gure out how open the other party’s market will be under the FTA and how 
much economic benefi t a party can get if the market opening happens. As we 
have now reached the fi nal stage of the procedure to validate the treaty—waiting 
for the legislatures of both countries to ratify the agreement—maybe it is time 
for us to pause and contemplate some macro issues related to the agreement as 
well. One such macro issue seems to be what it would be like without the FTA 
and what viable alternatives to the FTA the two countries would have at this 
particular juncture.
Viewed from such a standpoint, it does not seem to add much value to this 
analysis to merely argue that the FTA contains problems or is bound to create 
problems. Searching for a perfect treaty would never be feasible in the real 
world, particularly in a trade agreement that is all about quid pro quo. In fact, 
such an endeavor is not only infeasible but also misleading. A more accurate 
inquiry would be to look into the problems to be posed by the bilateral economic 
relationship and see whether they are FTA-unique problems that can be raised 
only by the KORUS FTA or whether they are simply an inevitable outcome of 
bilateral trade and would be raised anyway as long as trade volume continues to 
rise. If the latter is a more objective description of the situation, then the inquiry 
should focus on whether the FTA provides a better framework to institutionalize 
and manage these upcoming problems.
More fundamentally, a meaningful discussion of the KORUS FTA can be 
achieved only when both positive and negative aspects from the agreement 
are adequately taken into account. A balanced approach is critical in this 
process as the FTA basically embraces almost the entire economic areas of 
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the two countries. Neither focusing on the positive sides nor exaggerating the 
negative sides would help interest groups in each country accurately evaluate 
the full consequences and impact of the KORUS FTA. Recent debates on the 
KORUS FTA, particularly in Korea, appear to have lost this sense of balance 
in approaching these issues. Critics list the problems to be caused by a change 
triggered by a particular provision in the KORUS FTA, but they usually fail to 
talk about a better alternative and the looming problems regardless of the FTA. 
Neither have the proponents of the FTA made much of an effort to address these 
issues.
The KORUS FTA at this juncture seems to be a double-edged sword for the 
bilateral relationship. It could cut both ways. As a framework, it could provide 
the two countries with an opportunity to enhance the bilateral relationship, but, 
also as a framework, it could pose a threat that would potentially undermine 
the bilateral relationship. A lot depends on how the two countries apply this 
unprecedented tool to manage the bilateral economic relationship.
On balance, the KORUS FTA as it currently stands is expected to provide a better 
framework than the one we have now to address a wide range of trade issues 
occurring between the two countries. This agreement will help further expand 
and increase the bilateral trade from which both countries will get signifi cant 
benefi t.
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